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FEDERAL REGULATION OF INHERITANCE
EDMOND N. CAHN t
"You see it's like a portmanteau-there are two meanings packed
up into one word."-Through. The Looking Glass.
I
On May 5th, 1798, General Thaddeus Kosciusko placed a substan-
tial fund in the hands of Thomas Jefferson, and made a will authoriz-
ing Jefferson to employ the fund in purchasing the liberty of Negroes
and in "teaching them to be defenders of their liberty and country, and
of the good order of society, and in whatsoever may make them happy
and useful".1 Kosciusko then departed to Europe where he watched
with an expectant eye the conflicts between France and Austria, in the
eager hope that these might afford an opportunity for the resurrection
of his beloved Poland. On June 28th, i8o6, Kosciusko, who was then
living in Paris, executed a will by which he directed Jefferson to pay.
$3,704 out of his funds to the son of the United States Minister to
France, who bore the engaging if uneuphonious name of Kosciusko
Armstrong.2
The General died on October 15th, 1817, at a time when the
elderly Jefferson was harassed by his own pecuniary difficulties and
could hardly face with enthusiasm the ambitious undertaking so be-
queathed to him. On January 5th, 1818, Jefferson wrote to William
Wirt and explained the predicament which arose out of the creation of
the fund. Where was the will of this non-resident alien to be probated?
"The place of probate generally follows the residence of the
testator. That was in a foreign country in the present case. Some-
times the bona notabilia. The evidences or representations of these
(the certificates) are in my hands. The things represented (the
money) in those of the United States. But where are the United
States? Everywhere, I suppose, where they have government or
property liable to demand on payment. That is to say, in every
State of the Union, in this, for example, as well as any other,
strengthened by the circumstances of the deposit of the will, the
residence of the executor, and the place where the trust is to be
executed." 3
t A. B., 1925, J. D., 1927, Tulane University; member of the New York Bar;
author of Restraints on Disinheritance (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 139; Estate Cor-
porations (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. R-v. 136; State Gift Tax Jurisdiction (1939) 87 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 390; and other articles in legal periodicals.
I. Jefferson's interest in the subject of slavery had manifested itself in the deleted
clause of the Declaration of Independence. He wrote often on the social and political
problems involved. His own will liberated only five of his numerous slaves.
2. Armstrong v. Lear, 12 Wheat. 169 (U. S. 1827).
3. 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Ford ed. 1892) 96.
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We learn later that Jefferson proceeded to have the will proved in
the Virginia District Court, and that he renounced as executor. Before
he could apply for the appointment of an administrator with the will
annexed, he was notified of Armstrong's claim (which he deemed
'well-founded") and of other claims against the fund in his hands.
On June 27th, 1819, Jefferson wrote again to Wirt, suggesting
that these various claimants sue in the Federal Court for the District of
Columbia, interplead all interested parties, and have that court direct the
distribution of the fund.
4
Accordingly, Kosciusko Armstrong filed a bill on the chancery side
of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, alleging the validity
of the Paris will and praying for discovery of the funds in the hands of
the administrator with the will annexed, whose name was Lear.
Edward Livingston, Jefferson's great adversary in the Batture litiga-
tion, represented the complainant. Wirt, who represented the admin-
istrator with the will annexed, was now Attorney General of the
United States. The litigation dragged on and was not decided until
1827, the year following Jefferson's death. Joseph Story, the Fed-
eralist in Republican clothing, delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Court.
The litigation must have been embarrassing to the Supreme Court.
A decision for either party could only evoke resentment without serv-
ing the compensatory end of enlarged Federal power. The Court was
busy at that time laying the foundations for a century of commercial
and capitalistic expansion. The sanctity of contracts, the magic of
corporate charters, these were its prime concerns. No one could see
any special advantage in fussing with the probate of wills. Moreover,
a decision in favor of Armstrong would be interpreted as a gratuitous
slap at the recently departed Republican hero.
In the Marbury case and in the Batture litigation, the Court had
discovered how to extricate itself from such inconvenient positions.
Sweet are the uses of limited jurisdiction. If a litigation proves to be
a nettle, one should either grasp it firmly or let it scrupulously alone,
and if there is no active market in nettles, the latter course will prevail.
At least that is what Justice Story thought.
The bill was dismissed without prejudice because Armstrong's will
had not been probated in the state court. "By the common law, the ex-
clusive right to entertain jurisdiction over wills of personal estate, be-
longs to the ecclesiastical courts; and before any testamentary paper of
personalty can be admitted in evidence, it must receive probate in those
4. Id. at 134.
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courts." ' The sole authority cited by the Justice was a dictum of Lord
Kenyon in an action at law.6 In such fashion the United States Supreme
Court established the principle that, even where there is diversity of
citizenship, the federal courts have no jurisdiction on the chancery side
to probate a will or to administer an estate.
The only way that we can go forward at this point is by going
backward. That is to say, by considering some of the history of Eng-
lish probate jurisdiction, and how it came to repose in ecclesiastical
hands. The mists of our ignorance on the question lift only in the thir-
teenth century when we find the King's Courts according to clerics
virtually complete control over probate and administration. Holds-
worth suspects that the mailed fist of the bishops who participated in
the drafting of Magna Carta may have had something to do with this
practice. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ecclesias-
tical Courts were constantly cribbed and restricted from both the law
and the chancery sides, and their jurisdiction in practice was never very
efficacious beyond the mere grant of probate or issuance of letters of
administration.
7
In the eighteenth century this "lame jurisdiction" 1 was held to be
exclusively ecclesiastical and to include any proceedings to set aside a
probate for fraud.9 But the same House of Lords which laid down this
rule, held almost simultaneously that because of the inadequacy of eccle-
siastical procedure, the Chancellor had power to make any decree suit-
able to safeguard the estate pending the contest.' 0 Such was the law as
to personal property at the time that Story wrote, and if he failed to
cite the leading precedents, he was at least accurate in digesting their
purport.
All of this procedure had generated during an era when the owner
had no testamentary power over his real estate. The Statute of Wills
dates only from Henry VIII. Devises of real estate were thereafter
cognizable at law, and were usually established in an action of eject-
ment on the issue devisavit vel non.'1 The clerics never invaded this
field, probably because by the time devises were legalized, Englishmen
were no longer interested in saving their souls by the devotion of their
5. Armstrong v. Lear, 12 Wheat. 169, 175 (U. S. 1827).
6. King v. Inhabitants of Netherseal, 4 T. R. 258, IOO Eng. Rep. R. ioo6 (K. B.
179i) (involving the settlement of a pauper family).
7. I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1922) 625 et seq.; 3 id. at
583, 594; 5 id. at 300, 316, 320.
8. Matthews v. Newby, I Vern. 133, 23 Eng. Rep. R. 368 (Ch. 1682).
9. Kerrich v. Bransby, 7 Bro. P. C. 437, 3 Eng. Rep. R. 284 (H. L. 1727); see
Bennet v. Vade, 2 Atk. 324, 26 Eng. Rep. R. 597 (Ch. I742); Webb v. Clavender, 2
Atk. 424, 26 Eng. Rep. R. 656 (Ch. 1742).
io. Andrews v. Powys, 2 Bro. P. C. 504, 1 Eng. Rep. R. lO94 (H. L. 1723).
ii. Kerrich v. Bransby, 7 Bro. P. C. 437, 3 Eng. Rep. R. 284 (H. L. 1727); 7
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 362.
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goods to spiritual uses, and of course statutes of mortmain had already
appeared to discourage any undue preoccupation with the beyond.
This was the complex picture which Story had before him at the
time of Armstrong v. Lear. If the matter had been one which the Fed-
eralists then considered important, jurisdiction could have been taken
upon any of a number of plausible grounds. First of all, we had no
Ecclesiastical Courts in America, and so far as the federal system was
involved, the chancery side of the court was the logical successor of its
clerical ancestors.12  Secondly, the Chancellor in England had often in-
vaded the ecclesiastical field, usually employed a species of canon law,
and in fact was himself quite frequently a member of the cloth. Until
Thomas More, all of the Chancellors were clerics, and that circumstance
permanently molded equity jurisprudence. Finally, since devises of
real estate were concededly within the jurisdiction of the common law
courts, Story might just as well have let the personalty follow the
realty into the federal courts as let the realty follow the personalty out-
side. But as has been said, there were strong considerations of con-
venience and Story probably saw no use in fighting the Battle of Blen-
heim over a matter irrelevant to the business and commercial structure
of the country. Or at least he thought it irrelevant.
Litigants are not easily chased away. The decision in Armstrong
v. Lear served only as the archetype of a long series of similar contro-
versies which have cropped up in the federal courts ever since. Ap-
parently citizens of states other than that of the decedent have a way
of thinking that the Federal Constitution means to confer jurisdiction
on the federal courts in controversies between citizens of different
states.' 3 If the Constitution seems rarely to mean what it says, that is,
I suppose, because the glosses are so elaborate and artificial that the sim-
ple language of the original is lost to view.1 4 We are reminded of those
religious sects in which the meaning of the Bible is obtained from an
ecclesiastical hierarchy or from the study of an accumulated law code.
No one but amateurs or infidels will dare to look at the original text,
and that is why only amateurs and infidels ever learn how very lucid,
how very beautiful, that text is. Which is bad for the business of those
whose duty it is to interpret the interpretations.
12. On the origins of American Equity Practice, see Sprague v. Ticonic National
Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 164 (1939).
13. U. S. CONsT. Art. III, § 2 refers to "all cases, in Law and Equity" but, as to
jurisdiction predicated upon diversity of citizenship, to "Controversies". A neat argu-
ment can be drawn from this difference in language. Concededly not all constitutional
questions are answered explicitly in the text.
14. ". . . in Utopia every man is a cunning lawyer. For . . . they have very
few laws; and the plainer and grosser that any interpretation is, that they allow as most
just." THOMAs MORE, UTOPIA, in 36 HARVARD CLASSICS (1910) 213; cf. Justice Frank-
furter in Graves v. New York, 3o6 U. S. 466, 491 (1939).
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The reports are full of litigations involving the issues of Arm-
strong v. Lear, although for about the last seventy years little reference
has been made to Story's decision. The holdings on the subject are not
consistent with one another, and simply cannot be reconciled. 15 There
is always the question of degree, that is, how far will the federal court
go into the territory of administration.
Probably the deepest incursion was made by the pugnacious Court
which sat just after the Civil War. In Payne v. Hook 16 the Supreme
Court compelled an accounting by the administrator and a distribution
of the assets. In conformity with its neat volteface in the Legal Tender
Cases,17 the Court beat a retreat some six years later.' 8 Subsequent
cases tend to show how skillful the Court can be in permitting just that
degree of chancery jurisdiction which will thoroughly interfere with
the proceedings in the state courts without effectively securing to the
complainant the rights which he seeks.
The present law is that if the proceeding is "incidental to probate",
jurisdiction will not attach, but if the suit is independent and relates to
the interests of the heirs, devisees or legatees, the federal court can and
will undertake to act. We find progressively less discussion of the
function of the bishop and his surrogate and an increasing insistence
that matters of probate and administration are concerns of local law
and should be left to the local probate courts. 19 This implies the novel
proposition that where diversity of citizenship and the jurisdictional
amount are involved, a federal question is additionally required. I do
not for one moment believe that the decisions mean to invite any such
revolutionary inference, for they do not. They simply say that probate
is of strictly local concern because it sounds good to say that. Where a
denial of relief is based upon archaic historical distinctions, courts are
bound to cover the holes with any planking that offers itself. If the
planking is thin, at least the hole no longer gapes.
What is most significant about this jurisprudence, is the impression
that it has created in the general mind. The judges honestly believe
15. Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 174 (U. S. 1835) ; Gaines v. Chew, 2 How. 619 (U.
S. 1844); Fouvergne v. New Orleans, I8 How. 470 (U. S. i855); Payne v. Hook, 7
Wall. 425 (U. S. 1868); Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276 (U. S. 1874); Case of
Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503 (U. S. 1874); Ellis v. Davis, 1o9 U. S. 485 (1883);
Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 6o8 (1893); Farrel v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 89 (i9o5) ;
Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank Co., 215 U. S. 33 (i9o9); McClellan v. Carland,
217 U. S. 268 (19o9) ; Sutton v. English, 246 U. S. i99 (1918) ; also innumerable cases
in the lower federal courts, of which Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital, 34 F. (2d) 18
(C. C. A. ist, 1929) is an interesting specimen.
16. 7 Wall. 425 (U. S. I868), cited with approval in Sprague v. Ticonic National
Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 164 (939).
17. 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1872).
18. Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276 (U. S. 1874).
19. Arnstrong v. Lear slips out of sight about the time of the Case of Broderile's
Will, 21 Wall. 503 (U. S. 1874). Farrell v. O'Brien, igg U. S. 89 (9o5), and Sutton
v. English, 246 U. S. 199 (918) exemplify the reference to local law.
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that inheritance is a purely local phenomenon. They have been taught
that the federal courts are not the place for the distribution of estates
and that, except in most unusual cases, the division of large aggrega-
tions of capital cannot affect the national economy. Armstrong v. Lear
has, perhaps by political accident, set the stage for this deep and tacit
assumption. Inheritance's purely local significance has become an
axiom, factitiously illustrated and confirmed by the refusal of the fed-
eral court to take jurisdiction. 20 The impression so graven is particu-
larly deep because in these matters the federal substantive law so closely
follows the adjective. Where the federal courts decline to operate, who
will doubt that there is no national interest?
II
We cannot hope fully to expose the origins and genealogy of this
conviction. It is possible, however, to point to certain specific economic
factors which controlled men's thoughts at the inception of our Fed-
eral Government, and to show how those factors have been transformed
in the last century and a half. Thus, though such an exposition may
not yield the whole truth, it should sufficiently illumine at least part of
the subject.
We are limited at the outset by the shortcomings of American
statistical information. This country has been sufficiently sure of itself
and sufficiently extrovert in its national psychology, to be little con-
cerned with accurate measurements and precise figures. Social scien-
tists tear what remains of their hair when they discover the dearth of
2o. The analogy offered by the New York cases as to the jurisdiction of the State
Supreme Court is worth noting in detail. The State Supreme Court enjoys general
jurisdiction in both law and equity, the latter coterminous with that possessed by the
Court of Chancery in England on July 4, 1776. N. Y. Civ. PRac. LAW § 64. Gen-
erally speaking, the New York jurisprudence is to the effect that the proper forum for
matters of strict probate is the Surrogate's Court. Cassidy v. Savage, 15O Misc. i27,
269 N. Y. Supp. 751 (1934) ;. see Hard v. Ashley, II7 N. Y. 6o6, 612, 23 N. E. i77, 178
(i89o) ; cf. St. John v. Putnam, 128 Misc. 714, 716, 22o N. Y. Supp. i4, i44 (i927).
However, the Supreme Court will undertake to construe wills, to direct accountings,
and to issue all decrees which may be necessary to supplement the limited power of the
surrogate. Tonnele v. Wetmore, i95 N. Y. 436, 88 N. E. io68 (igog) ; Bankers Surety
Co. v. Meyer, 205 N. Y. 219, 98 N. E. 399 (1912). The jurisdiction of the Surrogate's
Court has been extended from time to time by successive statutes, so that intervention
of the Supreme Court has grown progressively less. In the Matter of Raymond v.
Estate of Davis, 248 N. Y. 67, i6i N. E. 421 (1928). It is noteworthy, however, that
by a set of statutes of longstanding, probate jurisdiction in a particular class of cases
has always been confined to the Supreme Court and is still enjoyed by it. N. Y. DEC.
EsT. LAW § 2oo et seq.; see Matter of Canfield, i65 Misc. 66, 68, 3oo N. Y. Supp. 502,
505 (1937). The analogy between the state and federal rules must not, however, be
pressed too far. If the state court of general jurisdiction declines to accept probate
matters, an adequate remedy is always available in the state probate court, where pro-
cedure is probably best adapted to such purposes. If, however, the federal court declines
to act in a matter involving diversity of citizenship, it denies to the non-resident com-
plainant a substantial right guaranteed to him by the Constitution. If diversity of citi.
zenship is a proper basis for federal jurisdiction in general, the rationale thereof would
seem to apply to probate matters.
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early statistical reports. But regrets do not furnish us with graphs."1
We will have to accept these limitations and be content if our ultimate
picture is as accurate as, say, a seventeenth century map of Africa, the
kind of map where the seas are peopled with dolphins spouting water
and the geographer has sketched "elephants for want of towns".
The thesis here is that the institution of inheritance has evolved
with the transmutation of the American national economy, that that
economy was at its inception basically agricultural and that it has be-
come progressively industrial and capitalistic. The subject matter of
inheritance was originally of such a nature as to warrant its considera-
tion in terms of purely local interests. It has been metamorphosed along
with the constituents of the national wealth and the national income.
Thus inheritance, like a tree, was originally rooted in the soil. The
tree has been severed from its roots, has been transformed by the in-
ventive genius of industry into paper pulp, and the paper has been
printed with the names of large corporations and banks, stocks and
bonds passing fluidly from hand to hand.
During the Constitutional Convention apparently no consideration
was given to the institution of inheritance. Representatives of the
states were met for the purpose of establishing a national government
and conferring upon it power over those matters which could not be
adequately handled at home. The wealth in the respective states con-
sisted primarily of large plantations, crops and slaves. 22 Even the slaves
were deemed to be attached to the soil, and were thought of as real
property.23 The law of inheritance was primarily one of descent in
intestacy or devise by will. Wealth was anchored to the situs of the
real estate.
24
Thus the assumption that the Federal Government had no power
to regulate this institution, was so complete that it remained tacit. One
21. The principal sources of which I have availed myself are the following:
WEALTH, PUBLIC DEBT, AND TAXATION, DEP'r oF COMMERCE BUREAU OF CENSUS
(1922) vol. I; 83 CONG. REC. (APPENDIX) 3086 (1938); DOANE, THE MEASUREMENT
or AMERICAN WEALTH (1933); NATIONAL WEALTH AND INCOME, SEN. Doc. No. 126,
69th Cong., ist Sess. (1926); NATIONAL INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES 1799-1938,
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD STUDIES NO. 241 (1939).
22. For a detailed description of post-revolutionary finance, see EAST, BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY ERA (z938). Much, however, of the
speculation here described is in real estate development, and compares favorably with
the Florida bubble of the 1920'S. There was also considerable gambling in depreciated
currency, id. at 214 et seq., and securities, as in post-war Germany. Plus Va change,
plis e'est la mnme chose.
'23. Chinn v. Respass, I T. B. Mon. 26 (Ky. 1824) ; Sneed v. Ewing, 5 J. J. Marsh
46o (Ky. 1831) ; McDonald v. Walton, 2 Mo. 48 (1828) ; McCollum v. Smith, Meigs
342 (Tenn. 1838).
.24 Thus we still find in our law the ancient presumption against charge of lega-
cies on real property, vestigial remnant of the centuries of landed wealth. The same
principle operated in the political field, as witness the property qualifications for fran-
chise contained in many early state constitutions. I ADAMS, THE MARCH OF DEMoC-
RACY (x933) 235.
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does not debate the obvious. In fact, the very thought of any contrary
view appeared so absurd, that Hamilton wrote in the Federalist:
"The propriety of a law, in a constitutional light, must always
be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is
founded. Suppose, by some forced constructions of its authority
(which indeed cannot easily be imagined), the Federal Legislature
should attempt to vary the law of descent in any State; would it
not be evident, that in making such an attempt, it had exceeded its
jurisdiction, and infringed upon that of the State ?"2
The evolution of the national economy must be analyzed from two
very different avenues of approach. In the first place, there are the
changes that have taken place in the composition of the national wealth
iself. These changes have to do with shifts in the relative importance
of economic goods to be found within the territorial limits of the United
States. In the second place, there are changes from the standpoint of
the use of national wealth in the daily lives of the citizenry, changes in
the form of ownership of property, in the form of accumulation of
capital, and in the form of its distribution upon the death of the owner.
The two modes of analysis must not be confused.
For instance, there is outstanding in the United States at the
present time about 76 billion dollars of ordinary life insurance.2 6
From the standpoint of the national wealth, this item is represented by
the real estate on which the insurance companies hold mortgages, the
railroad tracks and equipment, the water works and power plants
against which they hold bonds. From the standpoint of individuals,
the insurance policies represent, of course, contracts calling for certain
cash-surrender rights during the lifetime of the insured and certain
agreed payments upon his death. If this distinction be borne in mind it
will be seen that from both standpoints the composition of the national
economy has been quite radically modified.
Before considering changes in the constituent elements of the na-
tional wealth, we have to remind ourselves how greatly the aggregate
has increased. The total taxable property, real and personal, in the
United States in 1850 was only 7 billion dollars. By 1922 the value of
the railroads alone was 20 billion.2 7 If we extend these figures back-
ward to 179o, and forward to include the expansion in the production
of useful goods during the last eighteen years, we can see how far we
have left behind us this simple agricultural economy which knew no
25. THE FEDERALIST (Dawson ed. 187o) No. XXXI.
26. N. Y. Times, May 9, 1939, p. 38, col. 7, iio billion dollars, including all life
insurance, as of Dec. 31, 1937; N. Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 24, 1939, p. 29, col. 8;
Paul, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax (I939) 52 HARv. L. REV. 1037.
27. WEALTH, PUBLIC DEBT AND TAXATION, loc. cit. stpra note 20.
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railroads, no automobiles, no mass production, no holding companies,
no kited credits. And the progression has become geometric, since
every new invention has initiated another era of growth and expansion.
However great the changes in the aggregate of our national
wealth, the internal modifications of its constituent elements are much
more significant. It is the shifting relation of one element to another
that indicates direction. As recently as i86o agriculture represented
48 per cent. of our national wealth. By 189o it accounted for only 21
per cent., and in 1932 only 8 per cent. On the other hand, urban real
estate maintains today at least the same relation to the total national
wealth as it did in 186o. The large percentage increases during the
period in question have been in working capital, distribution, chattels,
stocks of goods, and transportation facilities.
2 8
The Immigration Act of 1924 has accelerated these trends. The
annual freshet of new immigrants has been shut off, relaxing, as the
years pass by, the pressure for homes and farms. Need for real estate
is substantially stabilized, while the increase in manufactured goods con-
tinues to mount. Moreover, the closing of territorial frontiers at the
beginning of the century has permanently fixed the land foundation on
which the national economy is constructed.
29
But this is not only half of the picture, and the form of the evolu-
tion will not appear complete until the other half is examined, The
nature of ownership has been transmuted as rapidly as the nature of
the things owned. From the standpoint of long-term change, we find
certain striking phenomena. In 1799 agriculture accounted for 39.5
per cent. of realized private production income, and together with such
dependent industries as transportation, represented well over two-thirds
of the total private production income of the United States. By 1937
the percentage of such income arising from agriculture was 12.3, after
falling in 1932 to a low of 8.2. Manufacturing, on the other hand,
which had represented in 1799 only 4.8 per cent. of private production
income, had risen in 1937 to 30.3 per cent. 30
If we approach the matter from the short-term standpoint there
are equally pointed morals to be drawn. The national wealth shrank
from 1929 to 1932 some 252 billion dollars. Only 47 billion of this
shrinkage was incurred by corporations, banks, insurance companies,
institutions, government holdings and the like.31 The balance was all
suffered by individuals. The banks and the insurance companies actu-
ally increased their total holdings during that vertiginous interval. To-
28. DOANE, op. cit. supra note 20, at io, 13.
29. See N. Y. Times, May 7, '939, P. I, cOl.5.
30. NATIONAL INCOmE IN tHE UNI=z STATES 1799-1938, loc. cit. supra note 20.
31. DOANE, op. cd. supra note 20, at 22, 25.
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tal national wealth in corporate or institutional form is on an ever-
rising plane, which occasional interruptions have not served to deflect.
One more set of figures must be resorted to. An analysis made in
1926 by the Federal Trade Commission of 41,788 decedents' estates,
shows that the proportion of real property diminishes steadily as the
total size of the estate increases. In estates over a million dollars the
proportion is less than 19 per cent., although the average of all the es-
tates is 33.4 per cent.32  The significance of these figures lies to some
extent in their own inaccuracy. The Commission treated incorporated
real estate holdings as personalty. Stocks and bonds of real estate com-
panies were classed as chattels. Consequently, the low proportion of
real property in the larger estates may be attributable to incorporation
of investment realty.33 In any case it is clear that either the large
estates hold relatively little real property, or hold it in such form that
the indicia of ownership can pass freely in the stream of finance. In
either case the capital aggregation is no longer moored to any specific
territorial situs.
This economic trend is a familiar story, and dull statistics can only
underline the obvious. The preponderance of agricultural real estate
has diminished constantly. Urban real estate has maintained a stable
relation to the total national wealth, but is either owned or controlled in
large proportion by corporations, banks or insurance companies. Its
title and the fruits of its use flow from hand to hand along with stocks,
bonds and mortgage notes. Upon this foundation arises a colossus of
personalty wealth consisting of all the machinery of industrial produc-
tion and the myriad products of that machinery. Finally, many owners
of this fluid wealth maintain their homes in several different states
simultaneously, and thus tend to eradicate by their own mode of life the
social and economic connotations of state boundaries.3 4
But early conceptions are stubborn. Up to the twentieth century
the Federal Government never seriously entered the field of estate taxa-
tion, except for temporary revenue during periods of war. The Civil
and the Spanish-American Wars evoked short-lived succession taxes.
These taxes were adopted to assist the fisc, and were abandoned as
32. NATIONAL WEALTH AND INCOM4E IN THE UNITED STATES, SEN. Doc. No. 126,
69th Cong., Ist Sess. (1926) 62. No similar study has since been made by the commis-
sion.
33. In the State of New York, 33,984 real estate corporations filed reports for
1938. As such corporations are confined to those "wholly engaged in the purchase and
sale of, and holding title to real estate" (N. Y. TAX LAW § 182, italics supplied), these
figures, obtained from the State Tax Commission, give only an inkling of the extent of
real estate owned by corporations. Neither the City nor the State of New York, as I
am informed, has compiled any analysis of the value of real estate so held.
34. Texas v. Florida, 3o6 U. S. 398 (1939).
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soon as the emergency passed.35 No one considered them of particular
moment, and no one foresaw how very deep and lasting their influence
might become. The Civil War statute was summarily approved by the
Supreme Court as a quite ordinary excise on the privilege of succes-
sion.36 Knowlton v. Moore, which upheld the Spanish-American War
tax is, of course, an extended and thorough if rather turgid opinion.
But when Knowlton v. Moore was argued and decided, its profound
public significance was not in the least appreciated.3t On May 15th,
I9OO, the day after the decision, the New York Times devoted its lead-
ing article to news of the hottest May I4th in the history of the weather
bureau. There had been six heat prostrations. The Times was still
looking under its bed for Aguinaldo, and was writing bitter editorials
against the monopoly enjoyed by the American Ice Company. Knowl-
ton v. Moore was not even mentioned, but much attention was given to
the arrival of three envoys of the Boers.
It is easy to feel superior thirty-nine years after the event.3 8 We
now know that the Knowlton case laid the foundation for one of the
most ambitious programs of estate taxation in the world., What has
not been appreciated is the extent to which this tax program has oper-
ated upon the national economy. It is time to recognize the actual ex-
istence of a new juridical fact: that the Federal Government now regu-
lates the disposition of large estates.
III
Some day perhaps a way will be found to harness and employ all
the heat that has been engendered on the subject of taxation to regu-
35. The history of these excises is rehearsed in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41
(1899). See also MYEas, THE END OF HEREDiTARY AMERICAN FORTUNES (1939) c. i
et seq.
36. Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall. 331 (U. S. 1874).
37. Before the decision, the constitutionality of the tax had been sanguinely denied
by at least one author. Hewitt, Gifts and Sales of Intoxicating Liquors Contrasted
(1899) 47 Am. L. REG. 737. The decision was virtually ignored in the leading law
reviews. The only contemporary comment of value which I have found was an edito-
rial (igoo) 61 ALBANY L. J. 314, quoting the Solicitor-General. The latter viewed as
highly important the holding that the Federal Government might tax a privilege which
it had not conferred. Moreover, a lengthy editorial of The Philadelphia Press is here
reprinted, with emphasis upon the sanction, in Knowlton '. Moore, of progressive rates
of taxation. It will be noted that the dissent in the Knowlton case was directed to this
feature only.
38. It is noteworthy that, in the early debates leading up to the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, a resolution provided that "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes and inheritance." 44 CoNG. REC. 1548 (19o9). So little had Knowl-
tot v. Moore won national attention.
39. The estate tax rates in U. S. S. R. do not exceed the maximum in the United
States, until the sum of 5ooooo rubles is passed. Moreover, Soviet government bonds
and deposits in state banks are wholly exempt Haensel, Public Finance in the U. S.
S. R., 16 TAx MA6. 517, 634 (1938). This compares significantly with the American
Treasury's generous interpretation of 40 STAT. 1311, 31 U. S. C. A. § 750 (igg), by
which the exemption of government bonds beneficially owned by non-resident aliens is
extended to gift and estate taxes, obviously to invite investment. U. S. Treas. Reg. 79,
Art. 2; U. S. Treas. Reg. 8o, Art. 13.
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late. "Taxation for strictly fiscal purposes" is, of course, the panache
of the orthodox. We find current economic and social opinion here
deeply divided,40 with the customary tendency to exaggerate the issues
involved and to erect fictitiously absolute standards to which only the
unwise or the dishonest will repair. Arguments on both sides have
been shot through with what I like to call the fallacy of Humpty Dump-
ty's cravat.
It will be remembered that when Alice met Humpty Dumpty, she
noticed the very attractive "unbirthday" present which had been given
him by the King. Her embarrassment rose out of the fact she could
not decide whether the band around his middle was a cravat or a belt.
It looked like a cravat because it was right underneath his face, and it
looked like a belt because it was right around his equator. A sharp
argument followed, ending, as most arguments do, only when the sub-
ject was accidentally changed.
Now, the essence of this dilemma was that Humpty Dumpty did
have a colored band around his middle, and that was the only real fact
of which notice should be compelled. Anyone who insisted upon calling
it either a cravat or a belt was bound to miss part of the picture, and
consequently to become very much absorbed in that part which he did
see.
It is the same fallacy which underlies all "either-or" arguments.
Absolute antitheses are too convenient to be true. In so complex and
pragmatic a subject as taxation, they are simply not to be found. When,
therefore, we are given the choice of taxation for revenue or taxation
for regulation, the option is false and so is the consequent debate. Tax-
ation must yield revenue or it is not taxation. Taxation must regulate
simply because it is taxation. Hence the decision can never be made by
offering, like Solomon, to split the baby in half. The economic opera-
tion known as taxation represents the indissoluble fusion of both
revenue-raising and regulation.
The questions involved, therefore, remain exclusively questions of
policy. We can use taxation intelligently to regulate, or we can use it
inadvertently and unintelligently. Of course, money is needed for all
of the purposes of government, but we cannot begin to raise money
without affecting all the course and current of economic activity.41
40. 19 Fortune, May 1939, p. 67, and the survey of public opinion, id., June X939,
p. 68. According to the latter, only 34.7 per cent. of the American public believe in
heavy taxes on the rich in order to redistribute wealth. Perhaps; but who will survey
these surveyors?
41. The political structure itself is similarly affected, in certain instances; at least
if we are to accept the position of the States Attorneys General in their opposition to
taxation of income from State securities. The Con.ititutional ImMunity of State and
Municipal Securities (pamphlet, 1939). The tariff on imports is an avowed instance,
but by no means so exceptional as has been believed. Regulatory taxes are at least as
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Sometimes, as we will find in the field of inheritance, regulation is most
farreaching when it is haphazard and unintentional.
The Supreme Court's decisions on the question have been rather
realistic, as evidenced by the now familiar pronouncement in the Son-
zinsky case: 42
"Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent
it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as com-
pared with others not taxed. But a tax is not any the less a tax
because it has a regulatory effect . . . and it has long been
established that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to
be an exercise of the taxing power is not any the less so because the
tax is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed."
The Court has not been unduly troubled by charges of ulterior mo-
tives for taxes.48  True, the taxation of products of child labor in inter-
state commerce was a shade too rich for its then sensitive digestion.44
That holding, if it is still law, has been the exception rather than the
rule. The excise in question had followed too close upon the heels of
Hammer v. Dagenhart.45  If the purpose of a regulatory tax is not
crudely obtrusive, the Court will doubtless seek some way to uphold it.
The economists prove rather more timorous. They speak of taxa-
tion for regulatory motives as though taxes in general had no regula-
tory effect. Most of them seem to feel that where regulation is desired,
taxation should be employed only as a last resort. That is because the
economic consequences of regulatory taxation are less predictable, or as
I should say, more unpredictable, than those of direct normative action.
Taxation in the eyes of the economist is a critical operation, to be em-
ployed only after all palliatives have failed.46
All of this is singularly abstract. Taxation is nothing but a name
for the process of collecting money for the government, and that process
is itself incomplete until the money is spent. The real unit in the eco-
nomic world is composed of the ebb of taxation and the flow of spend-
ing. The flow may exceed the ebb as now-a-days it does, but nothing
that is taken into the government coffers, or goes out of them, can fail
old as the ancient Roman imposts on celibacy. And if wise saws require modern in-
stances, there is, of course, the bitterly debated undistributed profits tax. Whatever the
demerits of this tax its greatest fault in the eyes of its critics was its efficacy: it did
compel the distribution of profits.
42. 300 U. S. 506, 513 (1937), followed in United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174
(1939).
43. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869) ; McCray v. United States,
195 U. S. 27 (1903) ; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1935) ; Magnano Co.
v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1933).
44. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1921).
45. 247 U. S. 251 (1917).
46. J. P. JENsEN, GOVERNimENT FINANCE (0937) 1 75 (summarizing the conflicting
views) ; A. G. BTEHLER, PUBLIC FINANCE (1936) 331-2, and see note 47 in! ra. Most
of the expositions are ambidextrous, viz. "on the one hand", "on the other hand".
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to divert and deflect the stream of private commerce and business.
Every tax, as President Roosevelt has said, is a deterrent, 47 if only a
deterrent to the retention of the amount of cash represented by the tax.
Most taxes are very profound economic influences, as no one can doubt
who has ever sat in on a meeting of business men when they were debat-
ing the form and desirability of a new enterprise.
When, therefore, economists assert that taxation is not per se regu-
lation, they sound like Heine describing Madame de Stall:
"Madame de StaEl was not ugly (no woman is ugly). But I
can say this much, that if Helen of Sparta had looked like Madame
de Stall, there would have been no Trojan war, Priam's city would
not have been burnt, and Homer would not have sung the wrath
of Achilles."
If we postulate the equitable distribution of wealth as a proper
purpose of government, even the economists are willing to resort to
taxation. Here is distinctly an objective for which taxation is the suit-
able instrument. 48  The only effective way to limit incomes and fortunes
is by taking part of them for public use. This seems rather obvious to
the naive among us, but it has not been sufficiently so to become an ac-
cepted dogma of American political life. Perhaps not until the Presi-
dent's message of June 19th, I935,4° was inheritance taxation openly
proclaimed as a deiberate means for the limitation of large aggrega-
tions of capital. The message branded huge fortunes with the stigma
of inherited economic power, announced that such power was as incon-
sistent with our national ideals as inherited political power, and urged
taxation as the means of combatting this jeopardy to the welfare of the
nation.
47. N. Y. Times, May 13, 1939, p. I, col. 6.
48. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FACING THE TAX PROBLEM (1937) CC. 9-14;
BUEHLER, op. cit. mpra note 45, at 491; JENSEN, op. Cit. mspra note 45, at 408, and
bibliography of economics of inheritance taxation, at 415; SHULTZ, THE TAXATION OF
INHERITANCE (1926) c. XII; cf. Hale, Our Equivocal Constitutional Guaranties (1939)
39 COL. L. REv. 563, on the use of taxation to impair constitutional immunities.
49. This is not to disparage the notable efforts extended in preceding administra-
tions. Among many others, Theodore Roosevelt, when President, and John N. Garner
and Cordell Hull, when congressmen, had helped to disseminate these concepts, which
may properly be traced back to the legislation against entails sponsored by Jefferson
during the Revolutionary, era. The 1935 message reads in part: "The transmission
from generation to generation of vast fortunes by will, inheritance or gift is not
consistent with the ideals and sentiments of the American people . . . In the
last analysis such accumulations amount to the perpetuation of great and unde-
sirable concentration of control in a relatively few individuals over the employment and
welfare of many, many others . . . Such inherited economic power is as incon-
sistent with the ideals of this generation as inherited political power was incon-
sistent with the ideals of the generation which established our Government." 79
CONG. REc. 9658 (1935). Interestingly enough, the President here advocated a special
legacy tax on large inheritances by any one legatee and corresponding gift taxes to
prevent evasions, the proceeds to be segregated and used to reduce the national debt.
Nothing has come of this particular proposal. Cf. HUGHES, FEDERAL DEATH TAX
(1938) 3, for a jeremiad on the estate tax rates.
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Thus the imposition of heavy duties upon the transmission of
property from the dead to the living, has become an integral part of the
federal program of egalitarianism. This was the intentional and pur-
posive part of the regulation-the part that the government understood
and desired to bring about. It was not the whole. Like an iceberg,
more lay underneath than above the surface. The high death taxes
enacted by the Federal Government have in truth served more to deflect
the stream of inheritance than to scoop water out of it. Federal regu-
lation of inheritance is a reality today, not so much because of the col-
lection of taxes out of large estates, as because of what is done to avoid
the collection. Congress passed a revenue statute without amending the
elements of human nature. It reckoned not only without the taxpayer,
but also without his lawyer, his accountant, his trust company, and his
"gently smiling" heirs.
It regulated inheritance without purposing to do so, and with no
thought of the consequences which we are about to describe. Before
considering these consequences, however, let the reader imagine that he
is a multi-millionaire and that on March 3oth, 1939, he has read in the
New York Times that an estate of fifty-four million dollars has paid a
federal estate tax of about twenty-five million., and a Pennsylvania tax
of about eight .and one-half million. Let him also imagine that he has
read that Mr. John D. Rockefeller's inter vivos transfers left only about
twenty-six million dollars for testamentary disposition. All of this will
give our hypothetical multi-millionaire furiously to think.
The federal regulation of inheritance thus has its first impact
in the determination of quantum. The law provides how much a man
can give and bequeath. It slices off a hearty segment of his fortune
and consumes the same as effectually for public purposes as though he
had so directed in his will. This has been described as the "toll theory"
of inheritance taxation. 50 What is taken might be called the public com-
pulsory share, just as we have the widow's compulsory share, and under
civil law jurisprudence, the children's compulsory share. The toll
theory has interesting applications. For example, Congress by allow-
ing a partial credit for state inheritance taxes, has virtually compelled
the states to enact lesser tolls of their own. And since the Supreme
Court has seen no coercion in this, we must have faith that there is
50. See Matter of Penfold, 216 N. Y. 163, 167, 1O 0 N. E. 497, 498 (1915) ; Matter
of Harjes, 17o Misc. 431, 433, IO N. Y. S. (2d) 627, 63o (1939) ; Matter of Ryle, 170
Misc. 450, 462, I0 N. Y. S. (2d) 597, 6Io (1939) ; N. Y. Times, October 4, 1939, p. 21,
col. 4.
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none. 1 The toll is a rather heavy one, enough to make Charon blush
over his modest obol.
The top bracket of a large fortune can be shrunk to the extent of
70 per cent. What serves as a mantle for the testator, may assume the
proportions of a handkerchief for his heirs. But the rates look higher
than they are, because the regulation has not simply a fiscal nature. It
has a propulsive force as well, and induces positive as well as submissive
action. The contribution to public uses and purposes is a type of regu-
lation, but by no means the subtlest. How much a man can leave to his
heirs is the end result of a series of simultaneous equations in which
numerous other factors are largely determinative. What is important in
inheritance taxation, is the direction which it imposes upon every factor
in this equation.
For instance, the tax statutes contribute substantially to the deter-
mination of the beneficiaries. The owner of wealth is told to whom to
leave his money. This is done by gentle suggestion and artful invita-
tion. Exemptions are accorded for certain near relatives, and unlimited
deductions are allowed for specified types of charitable, benevolent and
educational bequests. When certain states of the Union invite the estab-
lishment of new industries through contractual tax exemptions, it is not
perceived how closely they are imitating this same technique.5 2 If you
want new factories you get them by waiving taxes, and if you want
huge self-governing foundations, you get them the same way. The dif-
ference is in the extent of the exemption. The factories have to pay
taxes after a limited period of years; the foundations smile on in per-
petuity. That may be as it should be. This article is concerned with
other things than attacking foundations. It may be tremendously desir-
able to have a collection of these little independent sovereignties operat-
ing throughout the country. But we ought to know that if we get them,
it will be only because we have asked for them, and because we and all
who come after us will pay and continue to pay for them.
Statutory exemptions and deductions are conscious and deliberate,
and have been granted for a supposed public benefit, at least equal to
their worth in revenue. There are, however, other exemptions and de-
ductions which have been granted unadvisedly through leaving the door
open to tax avoidance of one kind or another. The intentional exemp-
tions tend to determine who shall receive the capitalist largesse. The
unintentional exemptions have a different operation. They dictate when
it shall be received and in what form.
51. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 (1926). For another method of inducing state
action, consult Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 3o1 U. S. 495 (1937) and
companion cases.
52. It is significant that these are bracketed under the caption "Subsidy Exemp-
tions" in TAX POLICY LEAGUE, INC., TAX EXEMPTIONS (1939).
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It is not necessary to add here to the volume of literature on the
subject of savings through transfers inter vivos.5 3  By now even Con-
gress must be familiar with the fact that our present gift and estate tax
structure is a potent invitation to such transactions. Double exemptions
and double participation in each tax bracket have given the inter vivos
trust a tremendous and unprecedented popularity. Whether this
development is desirable either from the criterion of revenue or from
that of social welfare, is beside the present point. What is here signifi-
cant is that the time when property is passed on to succeeding genera-
tions, is largely influenced, if not determined, by our present mode of
taxation. The will disposes of a remnant only.
Finally, there is the form of the transfer. The preferential treat-
ment given to life insurance has had a cogent and widespread influence.
The estate taxation of life insurance is still full of holes and slippery
places where the federal fisc is most likely to bog down.54  Trusts and
legal life estates are, of course, familiar devices for diminishing estate
taxes. They afford a ready means for bridging at least two generations
before another tax must be paid.55 And powers of appointment are
still invested with all sorts of weird magic, so that representatives of
the Treasury have been known to flinch and grow pale at the mere sight
of a special power.56 All of these techniques are ground out wholesale
in every well-informed law office in the country, and one cannot but
surmise that the government is outguessed in many instances. For our
present purpose, it suffices to say that heirs are receiving their inherit-
ance in the forms of life insurance, trusts, legal life estates, and special
powers of appointment, not because these are essentially the preferences
of the ancestor, but because they are favored with the grace of tax im-
munity.
We have traced some of the outlines of federal regulation of in-
heritance. The national government helps to determine (i) how much
can be bequeathed; (2) to whom; (3) at what time; and (4) in what
form. It is true that these propositions apply to larger estates only, but
that is as it should be. The smaller estates can properly be viewed as
matters of strictly local interest, while the larger do constitute, as Presi-
53. Gift tax revenue has increased from 4 million dollars for the fiscal year ended
June 30, 1933, to 34 million for that ended June 3o, 1938. The receipts for the year
ended June 30, 1936, reached i6o million. TAx SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD (5th ed. 1934)
173; id. (6th ed. 1935) 356; id. (7th ed. 1938) 393; N. Y. Times, July 27, 1938, p. 29,
col. 4. The rapid spread of state gift taxes attests the same trend.
54. See Paul, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv.
1037.
55. Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52
HARv. L. REv. 929; Leach, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax-A
Dissent (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 96I.
56. Schuyler, Powers of Appointment and Especially Special Powers: The Estate
Taxpayer's Lost Stand (939) 33 1. L. REV. 771; Griswold, loc. cit. supra note 54.
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dent Roosevelt has said, inherited economic power. The national con-
cern should therefore be limited to the latter.
Plutarch tells us of a man who threw a stone at a bitch and acci-
dentally hit his mother-in-law. Whereupon he exclaimed: "Not bad !"
But all fortuitous results are not equally happy. If the Federal Gov-
ernment is regulating the disposition of large estates, as it is, then that
regulation should be intelligent, intentional and teleological. Hap-
hazard control will have ill effects not only upon the economic system
in general, but upon legal institutions in particular. Here are archaic
devices of the law, such as special powers, exhumed and revivified out
of all relation to the normal social demand. Here is the useful con-
tract of insurance, grown ponderous and edematous. It is time that
we recognize the forces with which we are playing, and that we use
them advisedly. Inheritance has become a matter of national concern.
The limitation of mighty aggregations of fluid capital is a necessary
objective of democracy. In endeavoring, however, to attain that ob-
jective through taxation, we have largely ignored the by-products of
our own fiscal program. Under the surface powerful currents run
silently and unseen. It is the function of statesmanship to discover
those currents and to harness them.
